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The 1905 Parliamentary Crisis in Serbia 
Abstract: This paper examines the 1905 May crisis in Serbia that emerged from the conflict 
between the parliament and Cabinet. It places this particular crisis in the context of devel-
opment of parliamentarianism in Serbia in the period from the 1903 coup to the outbreak 
of the First World War in 1914. This process reflected the application of parliamentary 
system of government, as it was replicated from the British and French examples, to the 
circumstances prevailing in Serbia during the challenging period of building a democratic 
government after the autocracy under the Obrenović dynasty. The case of the May 1905 
crisis demonstrated that parliamentary democracy in Serbia was making progress despite 
the legacy of the “old regime” and the lack of tradition to build on. Hence the crisis re-
mained strictly within parliamentary bounds. 
Keywords: Serbia, parliamentary democracy, Old Radicals, Independent Radicals, Nikola 
Pašić, King Peter I Karadjordjević, cabinet crisis 1905
Re-established in the Kingdom of Serbia after the coup of 29 May 1903, when King Alexander Obrenović was assassinated and King Peter I 
Karadjordjević was elected as Serbia’s new ruler, parliamentarianism survived 
several disruptions and crises in the following three years.1 During this time, 
the question of Serbia’s foreign policy orientation in relation to the two blocs 
of European powers, the Entente and the Triple Alliance, was being decided. 
Both sides of political life in Serbia, internal affairs and foreign policy, came to 
be interlocked, affecting one another. Parliamentary life underwent three succes-
sive crises. The first emerged from the conflict concerning purchase of artillery 
in January 1905; the second followed from the dispute about floatation of a for-
eign loan in May 1905; the third concerned resumption of diplomatic relations 
with Great Britain in late 1905 and early 1906. At the heart of all these crises 
was a dispute about the principles and functioning of parliamentary democracy. 
The first crisis, in January 1905, reflected the relationship between constitutional 
factors: parliament and King; the second crisis, in May 1905, emerged from dis-
turbed relations between the parliament and Cabinet; the third crisis, in the 
winter of 1905/6, which involved the so-called “conspirators’ question” affected a 
development of relations between the civilian and military authorities.2 All these 
1 Alex N. Dragnich, “King Peter I. Culmination of Serbia’s Struggle for Parliamentary Gov-
ernment”, East European Quarterly 4: 2 (1970). For more detail see Dragoljub R. Živojinović, 
Kralj Petar I Karadjordjević. U otadžbini, vol. II (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački grafićki za-
vod, 1990). 
2 Cf. more in Dimitrije Djordjević, “The Role of the Military in the Balkans in the Nineteenth 
Century”, in R. Melville and H-J. Schroeder, eds., Der Berliner Kongress von 1878 (Wies-
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crises unravelled under the influence of internal forces that had risen from the 
1903 coup and external factors shaped by the Great Powers rivalry in the Balkan 
theatre in the early twentieth century. This study aims to outline the course of 
one of these parliamentary crisis caused by the clash between the parliament and 
Cabinet in May 1905 and the effect it had on a development of parliamentary 
democracy in Serbia before the First World War.3  
I
The first election in Serbia following 29 May 1903 showed further development 
of political polarization within the Serbian political classes. It brought about fur-
ther estrangement between the People’s Radical Party of Nikola Pašić (Narodna 
radikalna stranka), the representatives of the older generations, i.e. Old Radicals, 
and Independent Radicals (Samostalna radikalna stranka), led by the younger, 
mostly French-oriented intellectuals. Emerging from the general election with 
practically equal strength,4 the relations between Old Radicals and Independent 
Radicals marked the entire development of parliamentary democracy in Serbia: 
homogeneous Cabinets were difficult to form and thus coalition Cabinets be-
came a necessity. The Pašić Old Radicals offered Sava Grujić, who had replaced 
Jovan Avakumović’s “revolutionary” 1903 Cabinet, to form a new government 
either with them or with Independent Radicals.5 Looking for as wide a sup-
port as possible in the National Assembly, Grujić decided to form a coalition 
Cabinet embracing both wings of Radical Party – the MPs of both factions 
still had a common caucus. The reconstruction of the Grujić Cabinet in Janu-
ary 1904 signalled that the coalition was entering a crisis. Growing differences 
regarding certain political issues and struggle for the appointment of their own 
supporters in the ranks of officialdom was increasingly dividing Radicals and In-
baden: Steiner, 1982), 317–347.
3 External effects of these crises, especially in the light of Austro-Serbian relations, have been 
covered in the early chapters of Dimitrije Djordjević, Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 
1906–1911 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1962); see also Ljiljana Aleksić, “Rad srpske vlade na 
zajmu 1904–1906. godine”, Istorija XX veka IX (1962), 141–249; D. Djordjević, “Srbija i Bal-
kan na početku XX veka (1903–1906)”, in Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, Posebna 
izdanja SANU, CDXVI, Odeljenje društvenih nauka. vol. 61 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy 
of Sciences and Arts, 1967), 210–212.
4 In 1903, Old Radicals had 75 and Independent Radicals 65 out of 160 MPs. The other 
political parties, Liberals and Progressives in particular were rather marginalized. For exam-
ple, Prime Minister, Liberal Avakumović, was elected in one constituency alone out of three 
in which he ran for election. See the Archives of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
Belgrade (hereafter ASANU), no. 9287, “Memoirs of Jovan Avakumović” (in manuscript), 
part V. 
5 Alex N. Dragnich, The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia (Boulder & New 
York: East European Monographs, Columbia University Press 1978), 95–97.
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dependent Radicals.6 In the negotiations for a new Cabinet, in November 1904, 
both groups concluded that their coalition could not continue, given their dif-
ferences in the major issues such as floating a loan, purchase of guns and railway 
construction. The Radicals seized on the reluctance on the part of Independent 
Radicals to form their own Cabinet under Nikola Pašić. This led to the defini-
tive rift between the two factions and the secession of Independent Radicals into 
separate caucus.7 This event was of paramount importance for the political and 
parliamentary history of Serbia in 1903–1914. Homogenous Cabinets could not 
be formed because of the lack of an absolute majority in the parliament. Coali-
tion Cabinets reflected mutual relations between the two parties.8 From 29 May 
1903 to 17/30 April 1906 (according to Julian/Gregorian calendar – the former 
was in official use in Serbia until 1919), there were six Cabinets in Serbia with 
an average duration of 162 days: that of the “revolutionary government” lasted 
for 114 days, the first Grujić coalition Cabinet 126 days, the second coalition 
Cabinet 296 days, the homogenous Pašić Cabinet 176 days, that of Independent 
Radicals 213 days, and the second Grujić Cabinet 48 days. On the other hand, 
the weakness of successive Cabinets in the parliament allowed political activity 
of the “irresponsible factors” outside the parliament, gathered around the Court. 
“Behind Cabinets that sought how to survive in the parliament irresponsible 
persons were lurking”, Kosta Stojanović wrote.9 In the conditions of parliamen-
tary balance of power, the military and civilian camarilla around King Peter I 
6 The 1903 May coup brought about a change of personnel in the administrative apparatus. 
For example, four generals, twelve colonels and four lieutenant-colonels were retired from 
the army (Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine II, Belgrade 1909, 928). In a grab for service 
in the government, Radicals obtained senior and Independent Radicals junior positions. In 
October 1903, eight Old Radicals were appointed judges in the Court of Cassation out of 
fifteen, and not a single Independent Radical; out of ten judges of the Court of Appeal, there 
were five Old Radicals and one Independent Radical. Out of 24 presidents of the Court 
of First Instance, there were eight Old Radicals and eight Independent Radicals; the latter 
outnumbered Radicals only among judges, where the ratio was 27:24 in their favour (Steno-
grafske beleške Narodne skupštine, vanredni saziv 1906, 186; Srpske novine (Belgrade), nos. 
242, 247, 23 and 29 October respectively). The younger Independent Radicals, in particular, 
were vehement in their demand to “cleanse” the administrative apparatus from the people of 
the old regime. See ASANU, no. 12532/1, Ljubomir Stojanović Papers, Sima Katić to Lj. 
Stojanović, private, 26 June 1903.    
7 Odjek nos. 107 and 109, Belgrade, 10 and 12 May 1905 respectively; Vladimir Todorović, 
“Pisma o zajmu”, Odjek no. 81, 6 April 1905; Stenografske beleške I, 1906, 277, Lj. Stojanović u 
Skupštini 22 October 1905; Stenografske beleške II, 1906, 1156. 
8 “In Serbia, wills, wits and opinions are so divided that you cannot find a strong majority 
anywhere and for any purpose”, Jovan Žujović wrote to Ljubomir Stojanović on 17 August 
1905, ASANU, no. 12398/5. 
9 “Slom i vaskrs Srbije”, unpublished memoirs of Kosta Stojanović, ASANU, no. 10133, folio 
138. 
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had an opportunity to tip the balance in relations between political parties. This 
factor’s interference in political life in Serbia endangered the functioning of the 
political system as a whole, contrary to constitutional principles established after 
the fall of the last Obrenović in 1903. 
II
As soon as it was formed, in early December 1904, the homogenous Old Radi-
cal Cabinet found itself in crisis. A paper-thin parliamentary majority made it 
difficult for the Pašić Cabinet to resolve the major question of procuring a loan 
for purchasing guns and constructing railway.10 The negotiations about the loan 
caused conflicts both inside and outside Serbia. Foreign capital and large Eu-
ropean factories interested in orders from Serbia went a long way to secure the 
orders for themselves. This brought about the involvement of diplomacy and, in 
particular, the worsening of Austro-Serbian relations. On the other hand, the 
Old Radicals came into a sharp conflict with opposition in the parliament and 
the Court in their struggle for a loan and guns. The King’s civilian and military 
advisers among whom were some of the officers who had participated in the 
29 May conspiracy openly clashed with the government, drawing King Peter 
I Karadjordjević in political strife and shifting the ground of political conflicts 
outside the parliament.11 
Cabinet crises stemmed from these aggravating relations, which gener-
ated a constitutional crisis in Serbia given the forms of conflict and its partici-
pants. All three Cabinet crises, in January, February and April 1905, were not 
opened in the National Assembly, but rather followed from a clash between the 
Cabinet and the Court.12 They were overcome within constitutional bounds, be-
cause political parties defended the prerogatives of parliament in relation to the 
King, thus defending their own interests.13 Emerging victorious from the Janu-
ary crisis, the Cabinet was forced to capitulate before King Peter I in early Feb-
ruary, only to restore the balance of power in April when it suppressed the resis-
tance on the part of the Court in the matter of purchase of guns. It was then that 
10 The Old Radicals barely acquired majority in the parliament winning over to their side six 
Independent Radical MPs. Pašić was supported by 81 out of 160 MPs. See Jaša Prodanović, 
“Radikalna vlada”, Republika no. 23, Belgrade, 9 April 1946. Independent Radicals attempted 
to dissuade General Radomir Putnik from supporting Old Radicals but without success.  
11 See more in Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West 1903–1908 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1954).
12 The crisis of the Cabinet formed by Independent Radicals in December 1905 had the same 
cause. It was a conflict with the Court that brought down the Ljubomir Stojanović Cabinet 
as well as those of Sava Grujić in April and June 1906. See Stenografske beleške II, 1905, 1030. 
13 The Independent Radicals supported Pašić’s Cabinet in its confrontation with the Court in 
the January 1905 crisis. See Odjek no. 16, 20 January 1905. 
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the influence of the “civilian conspirators” was removed from policy-making.14 In 
the new circumstances brought about by the strengthened strict parliamentary 
system of government after 1903, there was no going back to “personal regimes” 
from the past that had relied on the army and administrative apparatus.
III
Overcoming dangers that lurked his Cabinet in a clash with the Court, Pašić 
believed that he had defeated the King’s opposition.15 Calculating that Inde-
pendent Radicals were not yet prepared to take office and having won over their 
leader Ljubomir Živković in the matter of loan,16 Nikola Pašić decided in early 
May to proceed with the planned procurements and ordered his Finance Min-
ister Lazar Paču to sign a loan protocol with French banks on 6 May in Paris.17 
Even the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, an opponent of Radicals, did 
not consider the demission of the Radical Cabinet possible.18 Realising that the 
loan affair would meet with a strong opposition in the parliament, the Interior 
Minister Stojan M. Protić started to prepare the ground for a new election as 
early as April by filling the administrative apparatus with Radicals.
The conclusion of the loan agreement in Paris caused a stir of protest in 
Serbia, which threatened to undermine the position of the Cabinet. The attacks 
of Independent Radicals on Protić in mid-February reflected the increasing in-
tolerance between the two wings of the formerly united Radical Party. At the 
same time, the Cabinet was taken by surprise by the attacks on the Minister of 
Construction Petar Velimirović.19 On that occasion, it barely scraped through 
the vote of confidence with the majority of eight votes. Debates in the parlia-
ment proved that the Cabinet found it difficult to rein in their own MPs. The 
press went on about how a good deal of Radicals was against the new loan.20 
The Austro-Hungarian Minister was informed that the King had dismissed Jaša 
14 Živojin Balugdžić fled to Zemun after the trial; Nenadović was also ousted from the Pal-
ace. See Dimitrije Djordjević, Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije, 73–79. 
15 When Petar Mišić, one of the leaders of the 1903 conspirators, supported Radicals, it led to 
a split among the latter. The Cabinet also tried to disperse a group of officers-conspirators in 
early April by transferring them from Belgrade to the interior of the country. See St. A. Wien, 
Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 47 A-B Str. vert. Hoyos to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 
13 May 1905.  
16 ASANU, no. 7940/30/1905, [A copy of ] Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 3 June 1905.
17 Archives of Serbia, Belgrade, Političko odeljenje, conf. no. 767, 25 April 1905, Paču’s tel-
egram from Paris, 23 April 1905. 
18 St. A. Wien, Pol. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 42, Hoyos to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 
28 April 1905.
19 Stenografske beleške II, 1904, 1303–1311.
20 “Fuzionaši protiv zajma”, Politika no. 472, Belgrade, 6 May 1905.
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Nenadović in late April because he did not want to provide Cabinet with an op-
portunity to open a crisis based on its relations with the Court, anticipating that 
it would fall on account of the loan.21
For all these reasons, an extraordinary session of the parliament sched-
uled for 8/21 May 1905 was eagerly expected,22 for it had to decide on the loan 
and on a trade agreement concluded with Germany. It was clear even before that 
session that it would be a stormy one: when Old Radicals proposed to Indepen-
dent Radicals to prepare a list of parliamentary officials, as customary, the latter 
declined, stating that they had not been consulted prior to submitting the loan 
for ratification.23 Such a refusal was tantamount to a declaration of war.
An even greater danger for the Cabinet lay in the ranks of its own parlia-
mentary majority. When deliberations in the parliament started on 8/21 May, 
the benches of Old Radical MPs were often not taken as opposed to those oc-
cupied by the opposition MPs. A number of prominent Radicals did not turn 
up in the parliament at all.24 It was clear that the Cabinet would fall even before 
the parliament was convened. In order to prevent a Cabinet crisis on a proce-
dural basis and intent on bringing it down on account of the loan, Independent 
Radicals left the parliament session so that it had to be adjourned due to lack of 
quorum.25
Faced with obvious languor and indiscipline of its majority, the Cabinet 
came to the conclusion that it could not rely on its own MPs, that the opposi-
tion was prepared for a decisive struggle and that a vote to approve the loan 
would be impossible in such circumstances. Therefore, Pašić decided to fall on 
the grounds of a failure to have the Speaker of the parliament elected, which 
would provide him with a reason to request the dissolution of the parliament. 
This would allow him to postpone the decision on the loan and to close the 
ranks of his own party. When the parliament reconvened on 9/22 May, Pašić’s 
supporters were instructed to vote for an Independent Radical candidate to be-
come a Speaker. Seeing through his game and trying to impose a discussion 
on the loan on the Cabinet, Independent Radicals backed the candidacy of a 
Radical to cut the ground below the Cabinet’s feet and remove the rationale for 
resignation. After three agonizing votes, Aca Stanojević, an Old Radical, was 
elected Speaker of the parliament, with the relative majority of 66 out of 138 
21 St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Hoyos to Goluchowski, 28 April 1905.
22 “A session of the National Assembly of Serbia has never been expected with such curiosity, 
as is the case now”, read Politika no. 472, 6 May 1905. 
23 “Izbor predsedništva Narodne skupštine”, Odjek no. 108, 11 May 1906.
24 For example, M. Milovanović, J. Jeličić, P. Savić, S. Kokić, M. Radojković and others. See 
Politika no. 475, 9 May 1905.
25 Stenografske beleške VII, 1906, 4445; Politika no. 475, 9 May 1905. 
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present MPs.26 Stanojević, however, refused to accept the position of Speaker in 
the existing conditions and Pašić had his opportunity to demand the dissolution 
of parliament, threatening with his own resignation. The crisis was thus opened.
IV
Events in the Assembly snapped Radical MPs out of their lethargy. Gathered 
in full force in their caucus, they approved the stance of the Cabinet, taking a 
resolute attitude: the National Assembly was to be dissolved immediately and a 
new election held under the current Cabinet. An attempt of Sava Grujić to seek 
an agreement with Independent Radicals was unanimously rejected.27 On the 
other hand, Independent Radicals decided at the same time not to make any 
agreement with Old Radicals and to accept a mandate for the formation of a 
new Cabinet under which an election would be held, if offered one.28 It was then 
that crisis emerged among Independent Radicals because Ljubomir Živković 
resigned as president of the Main Committee, since he disagreed with the deci-
sion of his party to form a Cabinet, if opportunity presented itself.29
Both sides, Old Radicals and Independent Radicals, agreed on the fol-
lowing: National Assembly should be dissolved and new elections held – in an-
ticipation of potential gains. All fourteen political and party leaders convened 
at the Court on 11/24 May for consultation were in favour of dissolving the 
parliament.30 Political public in Belgrade and the country in general, fed up 
with Cabinet crises, also demanded new election in the hope that one or the 
other party would finally prevail and ensure a stable government.31 However, 
the King opposed dissolution, partly because he doubted that the new election 
would result in a strong parliamentary majority, partly because he feared that 
dissolution would bring about unpleasant comparisons with the practice of 
26 An Independent Radical N. Nikolić received 53 votes, Lj. Živković and A. Marković one 
vote each, while 17 ballot lists (Liberals) were empty. For this election see St. A. Wien, Polit. 
Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 49 Vert., K. Dumba to A. Goluchowski, Belgrade, 22 May 
1905; K. Dumba, Dreibund und Ententepolitik in der Alten und Neuen Welt (Zurich 1931), 
228; Odjek no. 106, 9 May 1905. 
27 Politika no. 476, 10 May 1905. 
28 Ibid.
29 The Main Committee was reconstituted on 11/24 May. Ljubomir Stojanović became its 
president, while Ljubomir Davidović and Milutin Stanojević were elected vice presidents. 
See Odjek nos. 108 and 110, 11 and 13 May 1905 respectively. 
30 These were Independent Radicals Lj. Živković, N. Nikolić, Lj. Stojanović, Lj. Davidović 
and J. Prodanović; Radicals N. Pašić, A. Stanojević, A. Nikolić, St. Protić, priest M. Djurić 
and Sv. Simić; Liberals Avakumović, Veljković and Ribarac. See Odjek no. 108, 11 May 1905; 
Politika no. 477, 11 May 1905.
31 Politika no. 476, 10 May 1905.
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previous regimes.32 Finally, having been pressured by all political factors he had 
consulted, the King gave in but hesitated for four days before making his final 
decision. It was not until 12/25 May that Peter I signed the decree to dissolve 
the parliament.33
The decision to hold elections raised two questions that further aggra-
vated the crisis: the resignation of the old Cabinet and the mandate to form a 
new one.
While the resignation of the Cabinet was being announced in the parlia-
ment on 10/23 May, Pašić told the King that he requested dissolution of the 
National Assembly, “placing at his [King’s] disposal all portfolios in case this 
proposal was not accepted”. In fact, there were two resignations: one, uncon-
ditional, before the parliament, and the other, conditional, before the King.34 
According to the latter, dissolution of the parliament would exclude resignation 
and the Cabinet would carry out general elections, although it was in minority 
after the vote of 10/23 May. Central to this political game was Pašić’s tactics to 
outmanoeuvre his opponents: he resigned in order to rope the King into dissolv-
ing the parliament and, at the same time, tried to keep the mandate for himself. 
Old Radicals were particularly confused by Independent Radicals’ decision of 
9/22 May to form the Cabinet should King Peter I offer it to them. Thus, when 
the King finally accepted the dissolution of parliament, Radicals claimed that 
their resignation was not valid any more, all the more so because the King was 
still hesitant to accept it. This hesitation was brought to an end when Indepen-
dent Radicals stated to the King on 12/25 May that they “could not offer him 
any advice until after he accepts the Cabinet’s resignation”.35 The King then, six 
days into the crisis, on 13/26 May, informed Pašić that the resignation of his 
Cabinet had been accepted.
The stepping down of Pašić’s Cabinet posed a problem of forming a new 
government that would carry out fresh parliamentary elections. Negotiations 
that followed were conducted with four possible alternatives in view: a coalition 
Cabinet consisting of Old Radicals and Independent Radicals; a “neutral” Cabi-
net for the sole purpose of holding elections; a Cabinet backed by the existing 
32 King also resisted the proposals for dissolution of parliament in the crisis of January 1905. 
See ASANU, no. 7940/17/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, 21 March 1905.
33 Politika no. 478, 12 May 1905.
34 In its first copies of 9/22 May, the Samouprava, an organ of the Old Radical Party, brought 
news about “Cabinet’s resignation”. However, later copies of the same issue dropped out the 
news about resignation and published only Pašić’s statement to the King. See “Dve Samou-
prave”, Politika no. 476, 10 May 1905; Samouprava no. 107, 10 May 1905; “Povodom krize”, 
Odjek no. 109, 12 May 1905. 
35 Politika no. 478, 12 May 1905.
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parliamentary majority; a Cabinet emerging from parliamentary minority under 
the assumption that the impending elections would result in its victory.
V
King Peter I insisted on a coalition between Old Radicals and Independent 
Radicals. This would no doubt be the most durable parliamentary solution, as it 
would command the vast majority in the National Assembly. This combination 
was, however, not possible due to the dispute of the two sides over the concluded 
loan: one insisting on accepting it, the other on rejecting it. Initially, both par-
ties declined the possibility of a coalition. Radicals replied to the King that he 
had a choice to make – either resignation or dissolution of parliament, believing 
that it was only natural for their Cabinet to hold the elections.36 Independent 
Radicals Ljubomir Stojanović, Ljubomir Živković, Ljubomir Davidović and Jaša 
Prodanović professed that they were bringing down the Cabinet not because 
they wanted to take office, but rather to obstruct the loan arranged by Old Radi-
cals.37 At the meeting of the leaders of two parties at the Court on 10/23 May, 
Pašić and Stojanović decided to try to find a basis for an agreement. The nego-
tiations that took place next day, however, bore no fruit. Talks between Nikola 
Pašić and Ljubomir Živković who, after his resignation, was not authorized to 
speak on behalf of his party, were not less fruitless.38
Despite their initial opposition, Independent Radicals agreed to coalition 
with Radicals on condition that the latter cancelled the loan, that a new loan was 
arranged solely for the purpose of armament and that Pašić was excluded from a 
new Cabinet. On the sixth day of the crisis, negotiations took place between the 
two caucuses on this basis.39 But Old Radicals remained adamant. The Samou-
prava, their official organ, wrote that “there is no compromise” as “there can only 
be a complete abandonment of its own [Independent Radicals’] standpoint”.40 
Insulted by such insistence, Independent Radicals reproached Old Radicals 
that they used to change their leaders at a decree from the Court, and now they 
refused a coalition with their former comrades.41 However, being members of 
a young and inexperienced party, Independent Radicals were weary of assum-
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., no. 477, 11 May 1905.
38 Ibid. 
39 Old Radicals were represented by Sava Grujić, A. Stanojević, Milan Mostić and Jakov 
Čorbić; the delegation of Independent Radicals consisted of Ljubomir Stojanović, Ljubomir 
Davidović, Nikola Nikolić and M. Stanojević. See Politika no. 480, 14 May 1905. 
40 Samouprava no. 109, 12 May 1905.
41 “Koaliciona vlada”, Odjek no. 114, 18 May 1905. 
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ing power with something of an academic and purist reluctance.42 Old Radicals 
sensed this and played on that card. Pašić stalled the crisis, trying to wear down 
his opponents. He waited for a moment of attrition and apathy to impose him-
self again.
The King also worked for the formation of a coalition Cabinet under 
Mihailo Vujić, Milovan Dj. Milovanović or Sava Grujić.43 Vujić was the Serbian 
Minister in Vienna, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade learned 
that the Court, through a confidential person, had sounded out Vujić’s interest 
in forming a Cabinet in early April.44 The Serbian Minister in Rome Milovan 
Dj. Milovanović recorded at this time his bitterness against Old Radicals and 
Pašić, whom he accused of ruling with the assistance of dispositional expenses. 
Milovanović equally resented Independent Radicals and labelled them “political 
dilettantes”.45 In late December 1904, when the “guns question” reached its acute 
phase, it was expected in Belgrade that a moderate Old Radical Cabinet under 
Sava Grujić would be formed, with the support of Independent Radicals.46 The 
Court reverted to this combination during the crisis of January 1905.47 Follow-
ing the failed meeting between Old Radical and Independent Radical delegates 
in the parliament on 14/27 May, the King summoned Sava Grujić, in agreement 
with Ljubomir Stojanović, Stojan Ribarac, Vojislav Veljković and Ljubomir 
Davidović, to form either a coalition or a homogenous Radical Cabinet.48 Sava 
Grujić informed the Old Radicals’ caucus of the mandate he had been given, 
but he was cold-shouldered. Radicals were of the opinion – with only one vote 
against this decision – that Grujić should not accept it. The caucus even de-
42 Jovan Žujović constantly longed for his geology department and he implored his party col-
leagues to relieve him of ministerial and political duties. (See ASANU, no. 13209, Žujović 
to Lj. Stojanović, 25 August/7 September 1905; also Žujović’s personal archive, note of 10 
November 1905). Prodanović exhorted him to attend the meetings in Independent Radicals’ 
caucus rather than going to the meetings of the Geological Society. N. Nikolić relinquished 
his membership in the abovementioned caucus. See ASANU, no. 12709/1–3. Lj. Stojanović 
was tired of being Minister in 1909 and looked for a suitable excuse to resign. See Žujović’s 
personal archive, note of 11 August 1909. Prodanović also threatened to resign as Minister 
of Economy unless he was relieved of his duties. See ASANU, no. 12783, Prodanović to Lj. 
Stojanović, 2 June 1910.
43 St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien 51, Bericht № 49 Vert. Dumba to Goluchowski, 
Belgrade, 22 May 1905.
44 Ibid., 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, 3. 102, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 3 April 1905. 
45 Archives of Serbia, M. Dj. Milovanović Papers, envelop XXX/176, note from March 1905; 
also his notes from August 1904. 
46 St. A. Wien, 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, Dumba to Goluchowski, 9 December 1904.
47 Ibid., 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, 3. 73, telegram from Dumba to Goluchowski, № 5, 25 Janu-
ary 1905. 
48 Politika no. 481, 15 May 1905. 
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cided to expel from the party any individual who would accept a portfolio in 
the new Cabinet. Grujić was forced to return the mandate to the King, and he 
resigned from the presidency and even membership of the Main Committee of 
the Old Radical Party.49 Radicals defended their stance by claiming that forming 
a coalition Cabinet for the purpose of holding elections was a sheer nonsense: 
how could anyone form a coalition between the opposition that brought down 
the government and the Cabinet that was brought down by it?50 An attempt 
to establish cooperation between Old Radicals and Independent Radicals thus 
failed.51
VI
Since inter-parties conflicts made it impossible to form a coalition Cabinet, the 
press advanced suggestions for the formation of a “neutral”, business-like Cabi-
net for the sole purpose of carrying out general elections.52 After some initial 
hesitation, Independent Radicals accepted the possibility of a business-like 
Cabinet, convinced that they only needed to secure non-interference on the part 
of the government to achieve an electoral victory. King Peter I thought of a “neu-
49 Odjek no. 112, 16 May 1905; Politika no. 484, 18 May 1905.
50 Stojan Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji, I (Belgrade: Štamparija Dositiej Obradović, 
1911), 53–54 (reprint from Samouprava, 2–8 April 1908).
51 All attempts to restore unity in the Radical Party made from 1903 onwards failed. In 1904, 
a club of Belgrade Radicals was formed for the purpose of smoothing away the existing dif-
ferences. Cf. K. Stojanović, Govori i rasprave političko-ekonomske, I (Belgrade 1910), 103. At 
the insistence of a large number of members of both Radical factions, Stanko Petrović, an 
MP, undertook an action for reconciliation and unity in August 1904 (ASANU, no. 12823, 
Stanko Petrović to Ljubomir Stanojević, 26 July 1904). The MPs from the Belgrade County 
supported by their electorate tried to do the same (ASANU, no. 12749, Rad. S. Paunović 
to Blagoje Živanović, president of Kumodraž municipality, 29 November 1904). Radicals 
from the town of Užice tried to work together with Independent Radicals in March 1905 
(ASANU, no. 12456, Mih. Jovičić to Lj. Stojanović, 28 April 1905). Ljuba Živković broke 
away from Independent Radicals in May 1906 because of his failed efforts to bring together 
the two parties during the negotiations to form a coalition Cabinet (Odjek no. 53, 1 March 
1906; no. 100, 28 April 1906). In the summer of 1906, conversations were underway with the 
view to uniting again in a single party. Radicals demanded a simple merger, but Independent 
Radicals refused ( Jovan Žujović’s note, 4 December 1906). The Novi Sad-based newspaper 
Zastava also argued for a concord between the two Radical wings. In October 1906, high-
ranking Old Radical politician Jovan Djaja preached reconciliation between two radical fac-
tions in the pages of Narod. Milovan Dj. Milovanović, Mihailo Vujić and Sava Grujić spared 
no effort to that end (ASANU, no. 7940/45/1905, Czikan to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 5 Oc-
tober 1905). All these attempts and others that followed failed dismally.       
52 Politika no. 479, 13 May 1905; no. 477, 11 May 1905, “Ko bi vršio nove izbore”.
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tral” Cabinet as early as January 1905 and he spoke to the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister in that sense.53  
Business-like Cabinets were extremely unpopular in Serbia, reminiscent 
of the abrogation of the Constitution under the previous regimes. Politicians 
who found themselves pushed into the background after the 1903 change of 
regime bided their time to re-enter the political arena at the moment when 
confrontation between Radicals and Independent Radicals reached a deadlock. 
Jovan Avakumović also cautiously advised the King to have a business-like Cabi-
net, recalling the practice of Liberal Regents and reminding the King that he 
was a guardian of the Constitution even against a Cabinet.54 The former Fi-
nance Minister Vukašin Petrović rejoiced in Vienna upon hearing the news that 
a mandate to form a Cabinet would be offered to Djordje Pavlović, a Progressive 
and minister under Milan and Alexander Obrenović.55
Radicals were adamant in their opposition to the formation of a “neu-
tral” Cabinet both in principle and for practical reasons. A Cabinet must follow 
from parliamentary majority, Samouprava wrote, any other solution would not 
be a parliamentary one. The questionable “neutral” nature of any Cabinet put 
aside, such construction was but an augury of a reactionary and personal regime. 
This was a dangerous game in which business-like Cabinets were intended to 
sanction reactionary government and turn it gradually into a permanent system. 
Such governments had no support in the country and no authority abroad.56 
In Old Radicals’ view, even Cabinets formed for the sole purpose of holding 
elections were a negation of parliamentarianism: a Cabinet is to be formed on 
the basis of a programme and elections serve only to pass judgment on that pro-
gramme. Therefore, a Cabinet could not exist solely for the purpose of holding 
elections, since it surpassed in itself the purpose and aim of elections.57
Radicals also opposed the possibility of a business-like Cabinet on politi-
cal grounds. It posed a serious danger for their retaining a mandate, since Old 
Radicals were convinced that Independent Radicals would decline to come into 
office at the last moment.
53 ASANU, no. 7940/7/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 29 January 1905. 
54 ASANU, no. 9287/V, “Memoirs of Jovan Avakumović”, sheet 53.
55 ASANU, no. 10139/6, Andra Djordjević Papers, a letter from Vukašin Petrović, Vienna, 
13 May 1905. In March 1905, Petrović tried from Vienna to revive the activities of the old 
Progressives (Vladan and Andra Djordjević and others) by establishing the Main Commit-
tee of a peasant party, a faction of Kurtović’s Peasant Concord. See no. 10139/4, V. Petrović 
to A. Djordjević, Vienna, 14 March 1905. The activities of this group came to the fore a year 
later, in the crises in early 1906. See ASANU, no. 7940/37/1906, Lowenthal to Merey, 11 
August 1906. 
56 “Neutralni kabineti”, Samouprava no. 108, 11 May 1905; also, no. 109, 12 May 1905. 
57 Stojan Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji, I, 53–54.
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VII
The standpoint of Old Radicals’ caucus during the May crisis of 1905 was that 
a new Cabinet could only emerge from the existing parliamentary majority. In 
other words, they requested a mandate to form another homogenous Radical 
Cabinet, insisting that it was the only truly parliamentary solution. Indepen-
dent Radicals were not against a new Radical Cabinet in principle, but they 
demanded that it drop the loan.58 They also demanded that both Nikola Pašić 
and Stojan M. Protić be excluded from such a Cabinet.59 Old Radicals refused 
such and similar conditions out of hand as not being parliamentary, unwilling to 
consider any infringement on their mandate. Independent Radicals then made 
a concession, accepting Pašić but not Protić, whom they accused of preparing 
the ground for new elections with inappropriate methods even before the cri-
sis.60 The opposition press clamped down on Protić in particular, accusing him 
of abusing power. Pašić was, however, inflexible and he did not sacrifice Protić. 
Nikola Pašić left the King with a choice: either all Old Radicals relinquish office 
or they all remain.   
The intransigent attitude of Old Radicals with regard to the composition 
of a new Cabinet and the dogged opposition of Independent Radicals to the 
loan prolonged the crisis and created a rather uncertain situation.61 King Peter 
I found himself in a deadlock, having exhausted the possibilities of a coalition 
Cabinet and parliamentary majority Cabinet. Pašić’s weight was coming to the 
fore. After having outflanked the Court in the crises of January and April, he was 
now defeating Independent Radicals. If successful, he was going to become the 
master of Serbia’s political life. Such prospects turned the conspirators against 
him and they threw all their influence with the King onto the scales on the side 
of Independent Radicals.62 Their attitude finally swayed the King to offer the 
mandate to form a Cabinet to Independent Radicals, who constituted parlia-
mentary minority.63 This decision surprised everyone. Old Radicals, in particu-
lar, were disappointed and bitter. The Main Committee of Independent Radicals 
undertook to form a Cabinet with the limited mandate to hold general elections. 
58 Lj. Stojanović’s statement in the caucus of Independent Radicals, 11 May 1905, Politika no. 
478, 12 May 1905.
59 Politika nos. 480 and 481, 13 and 14 May 1905 respectively. 
60 “Minula kriza”, Odjek no. 113, 17 May 1905. According to Independent Radicals, Protić, 
in his capacity as Interior Minister, used an official cipher to request from county officials to 
name those Old Radicals who might be suitable candidates for MPs. See Odjek no. 118, 23 
May 1905. 
61 “No one knows how this crisis will end, neither the King nor MPs nor their caucuses”, 
Politika no. 479 wrote on 13/26 May 1905.
62 ASANU, no. 7940/31/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 13 June 1905. 
63 “Nov obrt”, Politika no. 481, 15 May 1905.
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A list of the first Cabinet composed of Independent Radicals prepared at dawn 
on 15/28 May was thus incomplete.64 The new Cabinet formed on the seventh 
day of the crisis immediately convened the National Assembly to read out the 
King’s decree on dissolution. The new elections were scheduled for 10/23 July; 
the convocation of the newly-elected National Assembly was scheduled for 25 
July/7 August 1905.65 With this, the Cabinet crisis was resolved.
VIII
Infuriated for having been driven out of office, Radicals breathed fire on the new 
Cabinet, threatening that they would resign collectively from the civil service 
and leave Independent Radicals to make do.66 
Starting the election campaign, Old Radicals accused Independent Radi-
cals of being pro-Austrian on account of their opposition to the loan and of 
coming into office through non-parliamentary means, as a parliamentary minor-
ity.67 Both accusations were designed to discredit the new Cabinet’s foreign and 
domestic policy. Both parties embarked on a fierce press campaign that would, 
to a large extent, mark Serbia’s political life until the First World War.
Old Radicals explained the formation of the first Independent Radical 
Cabinet in May 1905 by fatal influence of the past. “Le mort saisit de vif ”, Sto-
64 Independent Radicals had a number of capable politicians in 1905. Ljuba Stojanović and 
Jovan Žujović dealt with foreign policy; education was the domain of Ljuba Davidović and 
Jaša Prodanović; M. Drašković, Dr. M. Marković and David Simić specialised in economy; 
Nik. Nikolić, Drag. Pećić, Iv. Pavićević, K. Timotijević, Dj. Nestorović and Drag. Joksimović 
examined legal matters; Savčić and Vulović dealt with construction. Despite numerous min-
isterial candidates in the party, Independent Radical Cabinet was rather rump: Prime Min-
ister and Interior Minister Ljubomir Stojanović, Education Minister and Acting Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Jovan Žujović, Army Minister Colonel Vasa Antonić, Construction Min-
ister Vladimir Todorović, Finance Minister Dr. Milan Marković, Minister of Justice Nikola 
Nikolić, Minister of Economy Ivan Pavićević. See R. M., Kraljevske vlade od 1903–1935 (Bel-
grade: Štamparija Drag. Popovića, 1935). General Živković declined the portfolio of Army 
Minister and, because of that, V. Antonić, commander of 16th Regiment in Niš, was urgently 
summoned to Belgrade (Odjek no. 113, 17 May 1905; Politika no. 482, 16 May 1905). Nikola 
Nikolić resigned as soon as 23 May/5 June because he had physically assaulted Pašić for 
being insulted in the pages of Samouprava (“Nemio dogadjaj”, Odjek no. 120, 22 May 1905; 
Samouprava nos. 114 and 120, 18 and 25 May 1905 respectively). 
65 Odjek no. 113, 17 May 1905. 
66 Personal Papers, Jovan Žujović’s note, no date.
67 “Značaj promene”, Samouprava no. 114, 18 May 1905; “Zar baš tako vajna braćo?”, Odjek 
no. 115, 19 May 1905; Stenografske beleške II (1905), 1053, Stojan Protić u Skupštini, 12 
December 1905.
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jan Protić wrote.68 According to Old Radicals, the crisis was resolved contrary 
to parliamentary principles. Pašić’s Cabinet formed by parliamentary majority 
realised that it had no sufficient strength to solve major issues that were on the 
agenda and requested the dissolution of parliament and general elections in or-
der for the people to be consulted. In keeping with parliamentary practice, there 
were two alternatives in such a case: the current Cabinet could hold the elec-
tions, or a new minority Cabinet, if the King came into conflict with the major-
ity and acted on the presumption that the minority would win the elections. The 
latter solution was, however, dangerous for a monarch in case of an unfavourable 
election result and could thus be resorted to only in extreme cases. It was out 
of question if there was no conflict between the King and the parliamentary 
majority. Such a conflict could have resulted from the dissolution of parliament 
demanded by the Cabinet. However, the King had accepted the proposal of the 
Cabinet. Therefore, Peter I accepted the will of the majority and then offered 
a mandate to the minority. For that reason, the formation of an Independent 
Radical Cabinet was not parliamentary.69 To prove their point, Old Radicals 
advocated the principle of solidary accountability of Cabinet and parliament, 
invoking British parliamentary practice. “Either we stick to parliamentarianism 
or we do not”, Protić wrote, “if we do, we must work as other parliamentary 
states.”70
Independent Radicals defended the formation of their Cabinet, denying 
that Radicals had the majority. A parliamentary vote on 9/22 May showed that 
Pašić’s Cabinet was in the minority. This was a clear sign that the parliament 
would not work with it. From the moment it lost the majority, Pašić’s Cabi-
net became non-parliamentary.71 The King was faced with a choice: “larger” or 
“smaller” minority. He opted for the latter, believing it would provide a greater 
guarantee for free elections. However, although he was defeated in the Assembly, 
Pašić did not surrender and demanded dissolution. Forcing the King to consent 
to it, he made him an accomplice in the Cabinet’s actions. The Cabinet is, in fact, 
just a committee of parliamentary majority that mediates between the parlia-
ment and the King, the latter two being unaccountable factors. The National 
Assembly is senior to the Cabinet, because the latter emerges from the former, 
68 St. Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji I, Pritisak prošlosti (reprint from Samouprava, 
14 May 1906).
69 St. Protić, Odlomci I, Borba protiv većine (reprint from Samouprava, 2–8 April 1908) and 
Pritisak prošlosti (reprint from Samouprava, 14 May 1905). 
70 Ibid., Pritisak prošlosti. 
71 Radicals denied this, describing a vote of 9/22 May as “parliamentary coincidence”, and not 
acknowledging they had lost the majority. The Cabinet was in the minority, but there was no 
majority on the side of opposition. See “Izbori časništva Narodne Skupštine”, Samouprava 
no. 110, 13 May 1905.  
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and not the other way around. Radicals wanted, however, to impose a Cabinet 
on the Assembly, requesting dissolution of the National Assembly as soon as it 
opposed their Cabinet. Had Old Radicals accepted the terms of Independent 
Radicals, the Assembly could have continued its work with a new Cabinet, just 
as the French parliament had voted Combes out of office and then supported 
Rouvier’s Cabinet.
Although they opposed the dissolution of parliament in principle, Inde-
pendent Radicals justified their acceptance of general elections by a change of 
public mood. To prove their point, they adduced a number of examples from 
French, English and Italian parliamentary practice when a minority was given 
the mandate to carry out elections.72 Therefore, Independent Radicals were ada-
mant that the formation of the Cabinet was strictly parliamentary: if the rule 
was to give the parliamentary majority a mandate to form a new Cabinet, then 
the constitutional mechanism could be disturbed in case the King gave a man-
date to the minority. Such disturbance occurred when the Radical Cabinet lost 
its majority. The victory of Independent Radicals in the parliamentary elections 
in July 1905 – narrow as it was73 – served as confirmation of their thesis.
Political opinion in Serbia was divided in the aftermath of the crisis. The 
conspirators’ daily Mali Žurnal, Independent Radical Dnevni list, pro-Austrian 
Štampa and independent Politika took a favourable view of the new Cabinet 
and approved the manner in which the crisis was brought to an end. On the 
contrary, Progressive Pravda condemned the outcome of the crisis as not be-
ing parliamentary. Novi Sad-based Zastava was in favour of reconciliation be-
tween the two Radical wings and wrote to that effect. Legal theoreticians such 
as Slobodan Jovanović expounded the opinion that King Peter I was within his 
rights to dissolve a parliament that he found was no longer representative of 
popular opinion. Thus the emphasis was not on the crisis itself, but rather on 
its consequences, because the King was obliged to accept the result of an elec-
tion, regardless of its outcome, since doubts regarding popular opinion had been 
dispersed.74
72 Independent Radicals reminded of the following examples: Pitts’ Cabinet in 1783, Peel’s 
Cabinet in 1834, Derby’s Cabinet in 1858/1859, and Campbell-Bannerman’s Cabinet in 1905 
in Britain; d’Azeglio’s Cabinet in 1895 in Italy etc. All these were Cabinets entrusted with 
carrying out elections that emerged from parliamentary minority. See “Promena vlade”, Odjek 
no. 112, 16 May 1905; “Stara pesma”, no. 136, 14 June 1905; “Samoupravine zablude”, no. 145, 
25 July 1905; “U velikoj nevolji”, no. 153, 2 August 1905; “Je li parlamentarno?”, Politika nos. 
531–534, 6–9 July 1905. 
73 In July 1905, Independent Radicals had 81 out of 160 MPs. 
74 Slobodan Jovanović, Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Belgrade: Službeni 
list, 1995), 139. 
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Contrary to the two large political parties, the tiny Serbian Social Dem-
ocratic Party played no role in the crisis. “So far the workers party has been 
prosecuted by Fusionists and from now on this would be done by Independent 
Radicals”, the Radničke novine wrote. However, indifferent to a change of Cabi-
net, the Social Democratic Party was not indifferent to the hints that the old 
regime might be restored. Therefore, the Social Democrats condemned interfer-
ence of the “Court camarilla” in politics and attacked Independent Radicals, who 
professed to be democrats, for taking office from its hands. In the view of Social 
Democrats, the new Cabinet’s coming to power was not parliamentary.75  
IX
The crisis in May 1905 can be assessed from a general, societal and practical 
political point of view. The crisis served the purpose of clarifying general notions 
of parliamentarianism that had been making headway in Serbia after the 1903 
coup. Debate in the press and public concerned the questions of constitutional 
prerogatives of the King, the system of government by parliamentary majority 
and its relationship with parliamentary minority. Central to this crisis was the 
question whether the fall of a Cabinet brought in its tail dissolution of parlia-
ment. Essentially, it was a problem of relations between Cabinet and parliament, 
their trial of strength. Parliamentarism in Serbia without sufficient democratic 
traditions was torn between two systems adopted in Western Europe: the Brit-
ish and the French. According to the former, the parliament shares the fate of 
the Cabinet; according to the latter, the existing parliament elects a new Cabinet. 
The former system was viable in Britain due to the two-party composition of its 
parliament; by contrast, the multitude of parties in France informed the forma-
tion of coalition governments emerging from parliamentary majority. With her 
own structure of political parties, Serbia was somewhere between British and 
French parliamentary practice: in 1905, she had five political parties, but two of 
them stood out as the largest. However, the balance of strength between Radi-
cals and Independent Radicals made the formation of a homogenous Cabinet 
difficult. For that reason, although parliamentarianism in Serbia came close to 
British parliamentary practice, the need for coalition-making facilitated the ap-
plication of the French system.
Conflict regarding relations between executive power and parliament re-
flected different viewpoints and interests. Relying on the numerous and strong 
administrative apparatus, the Cabinet tended to impose itself on the parliament. 
Arguing for supremacy of Cabinet over parliament, Old Radicals represented 
the interests of traditional entrepreneurial groups in Serbia that called for a 
75 “Tiranija tevabije”, Radničke novine no. 49, 4 June 1905; “Posle smene”, no. 45, 21 May 1905; 
“Situacija”, no. 43, 14 May 1905. 
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“strong” Cabinet. On the other side, arguing for predominance of the National 
Assembly, Independent Radicals expressed the views of the growing number 
of younger democratic groups within Serbian society that wanted to ensure a 
democratic system through the strict application of parliamentary democracy.
Conflict concerning these questions was amplified because Serbian soci-
ety and its political classes were in the permanent process of stratification, with 
modern business-oriented elite taking shape since the late nineteenth century 
in step with Serbia’s economic development.76 Therefore, parliamentary democ-
racy was in many ways still very fragile. That crisis was not as pronounced at this 
time as it had been in the last decades of the nineteenth century, for democracy 
had scored victory in 1903 over the Court and the autocratic, “personal regimes” 
of the last Obrenović kings that had relied on the Army and bureaucracy. For 
that reason, the 1905 May crisis remained within boundaries of parliamentary 
democracy.
The struggle for a mandate to form Cabinet that would carry out general 
elections showed how important it was in Serbia to acquire control over the 
election process, despite all the constitutional and legal provisions established 
after the 1903 coup, which guaranteed free elections for the National Assembly. 
This stemmed from the role that the administrative apparatus played in Ser-
bia’s political life. The formation of an Independent Radical Cabinet in 1905 sig-
nalled the beginning of a fierce and relentless struggle between the two Radical 
groups, since Independent Radicals demonstrated to their opponents through 
their acceptance to form their own Cabinet that they were not just capable of be-
ing opposition, but were also able to take office. Therefrom their mutual rivalries 
further increased and coloured political life in the Kingdom of Serbia, exerting 
a considerable influence on the development of parliamentary democracy until 
the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914. 
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